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INTRODUCTION
Judicial review of administrative agency decisions is an important topic
in the fields of both administrative and appellate law. Any significant agency
action is likely to be tested in court, so judicial review is often an unofficial
necessity before a new regulation or adjudicative decision can truly be
considered “settled law.”1 The applicable standards of review in an eventual
appeal also influence how an agency must approach its decision-making.
One might expect fairly uniform standards and procedures for appellate
review of an agency action, just as there are for appeals of trial court
decisions.
Procedurally, however, an administrative appeal is a fundamentally
different creature from a judicial appeal. Indeed, an administrative appeal is
not even a true “appeal,” but rather an action invoking a court’s original
jurisdiction.2 Moreover, while an appeal of a trial court’s ruling involves a
superior tribunal reviewing the decision of an inferior one within the same
branch of government, a court reviewing an agency’s decision sits in
judgment of the policy decisions of a coordinate branch of government and
is constrained by separation-of-powers principles.
Federal and Maryland law treat administrative appeals similarly—
except when they don’t. And their differences are notable.3 For instance,
Maryland courts possess a significant measure of the autonomy that federal
courts arguably lack: Congress (along with the federal courts themselves) has
shielded several small but important categories of agency acts from federal
court review, whereas Maryland courts have held that the legislature cannot
divest courts of their inherent authority to review even “unreviewable”
agency acts.4 Likewise, federal review is often characterized by a significant
and robust set of deference principles that courts must adhere to. While

1. See infra Section II.A.
2. See infra Part IV.
3. See, e.g., Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L.
REV. 297, 300–02 (1986) (describing the development and iterations of the Model State
Administrative Procedure Act as drawing from, but not necessarily replicating, the federal APA).
4. See infra Section II.B.3.
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Maryland courts defer to agencies as well, it is more a matter of comity than
judicial restraint, and courts always retain the final word on the law they are
reviewing.5
The scholarly treatment of federal administrative law has been, to put it
mildly, extensive. But even though state regulation is “no less important”
than federal regulation,6 the regulatory review procedures of Maryland (and
other states) receive far less attention. Maryland,7 like the federal system,8
has well-developed judicial-review principles governed by an administrative
procedure act (“APA”), the Maryland Rules, and an extensive body of case
law.9
The purpose of this Article is to provide a basic analysis of the ways
both federal and Maryland courts review the actions of administrative
agencies. The landscape of administrative law is vast, and this Article is
focused on one small but important corner of that landscape. It describes the
judicial review process under each system, and examines some important
similarities and distinctions between federal and Maryland regulatory
appellate practice, particularly in light of recent decisions by the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Court of Appeals of Maryland.10
The natural question raised by this examination is how these two
systems differ in actual operation. The surprising—and unsatisfying—
answer is that it is difficult to say for sure. The vernacular of administrative
law is filled with capacious terms like “arbitrary,” “capricious,” “excess,” or
“unlawful,” to which it is impossible to assign concrete values.11 This means
similar-sounding concepts may actually be dissimilar. For example,
Maryland and federal courts both examine whether certain agency actions
5. See infra Part III.
6. See, e.g., PAUL TESKE, REGULATION IN THE STATES 8 (2004) (“Sometimes state regulation
is extremely innovative. . . . Other times it leads to colossal failures. Perhaps most often, it leads
to more subtle effects on state economies that are often overlooked . . . .”); Jonathan H. Adler, When
is Two a Crowd? The Impact of Federal Action on State Environmental Regulation, 31 HARV.
ENV’T L. REV. 67, 68–70 (2007) (stressing the interrelatedness of state and federal environmental
regulations).
7. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T §§ 10-101–10-305 (West 2022).
8. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2018)).
9. See, e.g., Christopher J. Walker, The Lost World of the Administrative Procedure Act: A
Literature Review, 28 GEO. MASON L. REV. 733, 734–35 (2021) (“The APA . . . has evolved
considerably over the decades. Indeed, the statutory text bears little resemblance to modern
regulatory practice. The Supreme Court and the lower courts—with the D.C. Circuit playing a
prominent role—have substantially rewritten the rules of the road.”).
10. In November 2022, Marylanders will vote on whether to ratify a constitutional amendment
renaming the State’s two appellate courts as the Supreme Court of Maryland and the Appellate
Court of Maryland. See H.B. 885, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2021).
11. See infra Part II.B.2.c.
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were “arbitrary or capricious,” but as we will see, the way they frame that
analysis varies appreciably. While we highlight conceptual differences
between the two systems, we do not attempt to predict where they would or
would not lead to different results. That important empirical question—if it
can be answered—is worthy of further exploration.12
We start in Part I by introducing the foundational rulemaking–
adjudication dichotomy that heavily influences the trajectory of judicial
review. Part II then draws out the nuances of when and in what form judicial
review is available for agency actions. Part III identifies key distinctions in
how the courts in each jurisdiction exercise their substantive review of an
agency’s legal interpretation. Finally, Part IV describes the methods of
invoking judicial review in the Maryland and federal systems.
I. DETERMINING WHAT KIND OF ACTION IS BEING REVIEWED: THE
RULEMAKING–ADJUDICATION DICHOTOMY
Identifying the type of agency action being challenged is essential to
determining the standards that will govern an appeal. Most agency actions
fall into two categories: rulemaking and adjudication.13 This dichotomy
exists in both federal and Maryland law, although Maryland courts describe
agency actions as “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial.” The distinction
between rulemaking (or quasi-legislative action) and adjudication (or quasijudicial action) is crucial. In addition to dictating the procedure an agency
must follow—which can significantly affect the arguments available on
appeal—the type of action will determine the source of the court’s authority
to review it, the procedure for invoking review, and the appropriate standard
of review. Because the law applicable to a particular administrative appeal
depends upon the kind of action at issue, that question is the starting point of
the analysis.
Identifying whether a particular agency decision resulted from an
adjudication or a rulemaking can be surprisingly contentious, the distinction
12. An existing body of empirical research into administrative agency review may serve as the
starting point for such exploration. See, e.g., Amy Semet, Statutory Interpretation and Chevron
Deference in the Appellate Courts: An Empirical Analysis, 12 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 621 (2022);
Carly L. Hviding, What Deference Does it Make? Reviewing Agency Statutory Interpretation in
Maryland, 81 MD. L. REV. ONLINE 12 (2021); Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in
the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2017); Cynthia Barmore, Auer in Action: Deference After
Talk America, 76 OHIO STATE L. J. 813 (2015).
13. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ATT’Y GEN.’S MANUAL ON THE ADMIN. PROC. ACT 14 (1947)
[hereinafter ATT’Y GEN.’S MANUAL]. To this we can add an important third category for informal
actions, though review of those is rare due to a lack of final agency action. See, e.g., ALFRED C.
AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 355 (3d ed. 2014) (“To determine when
these various standards of review apply . . . it is important to note that the APA divides the world
of agency action into three parts, differentiating among rules, orders and informal actions.”).
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subtle and elusive.14 There are nonetheless certain clear examples that can
make it easier to understand the distinction. The classic example of a
rulemaking is when an agency promulgates a new regulation. Examples of
adjudications can include the disposition of complaints brought before an
agency, the award of a contract, or the issuance of a license. However, many
agency actions fall somewhere in between. Agencies do things like issue
interpretive rulings, grant petitions for declaratory ruling, and make decisions
that affect discrete classes of individuals outside the context of evidentiary
hearings.
Reviewing courts regularly grapple with which category these kinds of
actions fall in. For example, in Neustar, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission,15 the D.C. Circuit had to determine whether the FCC’s selection
of a company to administer a database of phone numbers was a rule or an
adjudication.16 The petitioner argued that the decision was a rule, and that
the FCC had not followed the correct procedure for issuing a rule.17 Although
the FCC’s decision arguably bore certain hallmarks of a rule, the court
ultimately determined that it was an adjudication, and thus that the FCC was
not required to follow rulemaking procedures.18 Thus, while the question is
in some sense highly academic, it can have significant, even dispositive
practical consequences.
Although the question of whether a given action constitutes a
rulemaking or an adjudication can be knotty and complex, there are relatively
clear statutory and decisional rules that spell out which factors go into that
analysis. We start, in Section I.A, with the Constitution, which obligates state
and federal governments to provide procedural protections before engaging
in adjudications—but not rulemakings—before explaining, in Section I.B,
how the Federal APA and Maryland APA implement the dichotomy.
A. U.S. Constitution—Legislative and Adjudicative Actions
Apart from the statutory requirements of the Maryland APA and the
Federal APA, the rulemaking–adjudication dichotomy carries constitutional
14. Cf., e.g., William D. Araiza, Agency Adjudication, the Importance of Facts, and the
Limitations of Labels, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351, 404 (2000) (“In labeling some agency actions
‘adjudications’ we may have succeeded only in confusing ourselves by suggesting that there is a
fundamental identity between what courts do and what agency ‘adjudicators’ do.”).
15. 857 F.3d 886 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
16. Id. at 891–92.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 894; see also Md. Bd. of Pub. Works v. K. Hovnanian’s Four Seasons at Kent Island,
LLC, 425 Md. 482, 513–14, 42 A.3d 40, 58–59 (2012) (considering proper characterization—and
thus proper standard of review—of Maryland Board of Public Works’ decision denying a permit to
dredge on State wetlands).
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importance under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clauses.19 As explained in two century-old Supreme Court opinions—
predating the APA’s statutory conceptions of rules and adjudications—the
government owes individualized due process (i.e., an adjudication) before
singling people out and depriving them of property, but does not owe any
additional process before acting legislatively.20 Thus, in Londoner v. City &
County of Denver,21 the Court held that the Denver City Council, acting as a
board of equalization, had engaged in de facto adjudication in establishing a
tax assessment district requiring a small group of landowners to pay to pave
a street abutting their properties.22 In contrast, in Bi-Metallic Investment Co.
v. State Board of Equalization,23 the Court upheld the Colorado State Board
of Equalization’s legislative decision to increase the valuation of all taxable
property in Denver by forty percent.24 Explaining the distinction, Justice
Holmes noted that “[w]here a rule of conduct applies to more than a few
people it is impracticable that every one should have a direct voice in its
adoption.”25
Aside from pointing to the number of persons affected by an agency act,
neither Supreme Court decision provides significant guidance on how to
draw the line between rulemaking and adjudications for purposes of the Due
Process Clauses,26 and the federal courts of appeals have recognized that “the
line between legislative and adjudicative action for purposes of procedural
due process analysis is not always easy to draw.”27 Thus, lower federal
appellate court decisions have evaluated factors such as the function
performed by the decisionmaker (for example, resolving disputes of facts as
an adjudicator versus disputes of policy as a legislator)28 or the generality and
prospective effect of the challenged action.29 Though the decision to make

19. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
20. Londoner v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385–86 (1908); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 443 (1915).
21. 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
22. Id. at 385–86.
23. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
24. Id. at 443.
25. Id. at 445.
26. Cf., e.g., 75 Acres, LLC v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 338 F.3d 1288, 1293, 1296 n.11 (11th Cir.
2003) (declining to “adopt a hard-and-fast rule for distinguishing between legislative and
adjudicative action”).
27. See, e.g., Garcia-Rubiera v. Fortuno, 665 F.3d 261, 274 (1st Cir. 2011).
28. E.g., Thomas v. City of New York, 143 F.3d 31, 36 n.7 (2d Cir. 1998).
29. See, e.g., L C & S, Inc. v. Warren Cnty. Area Plan Comm’n, 244 F.3d 601, 604 (7th Cir.
2001).
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policies using rules or adjudications will only rarely implicate the Due
Process Clause, in light of the statutory procedural protections discussed
below,30 it remains an important constraint on the form of agency decisionmaking.31
B. Federal Statutory Law—Rulemakings and Adjudications
The Federal APA defines a rulemaking as an “agency process for
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule,”32 and defines a rule as “the
whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability
and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or
policy.”33 An adjudication, in turn, is an “agency process for the formulation
of an order,”34 with an order being “the whole or a part of a final
disposition . . . of an agency in a matter other than rule making.”35 Rules
announce generally applicable policies with future effect only,36 whereas

30. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383,
1409 (2004) (“In the broad run of federal regulation, the Due Process Clause does not require an
adjudicatory hearing.”).
31. Compare, e.g., Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016, 1048 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc)
(“The felons were deprived of the right to vote through legislative action, not adjudicative
action. . . . This [Florida] constitutional provision is a law ‘of general applicability’ that plainly
qualifies as legislative action.” (quoting 75 Acres, 338 F.3d at 1296–97)), with, e.g., id. at 1061 n.1
(Martin, J., dissenting) (“Because the Division[] [of Elections’] determinations are necessarily
individualized and fact-specific, Florida’s voter reenfranchisement scheme is one for which
‘persons [are] . . . exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual grounds’ and entitled to due
process.” (quoting Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915)
(second alteration in original)).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5).
33. Id. § 551(4).
34. Id. § 551(7).
35. Id. § 551(6).
36. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 216 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“[R]ules have legal consequences only for the future.”); see also ATT’Y GEN.’S MANUAL, supra
note 13, at 14 (“Rule making is agency action which regulates the future conduct of either groups
of persons or a single person; it is essentially legislative in nature, not only because it operates in
the future but also because it is primarily concerned with policy considerations. The object of the
rule making proceeding is the implementation or prescription of law or policy for the future, rather
than the evaluation of a respondent’s past conduct.”).
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adjudications can have both future and retroactive effect37 and can decide the
rights of specific parties based on individual factors.38
The facial simplicity of these statutory directives for choosing between
rulemaking or adjudication is belied by the gray area resulting from over
seventy years of Supreme Court precedent deferring to agencies’ decisions
about which mechanism to employ in achieving a particular objective.39
Under the doctrine set forth in SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II),40 agencies
have wide latitude to announce new principles of general applicability in an
adjudication, even if the resulting policy change would be equally or more
appropriately suited for rulemaking.41 In Chenery II, for example, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), while considering a
company’s reorganization plan, prohibited controlling stockholders from
purchasing preferred stock during the reorganization—a classic example of
an adjudicatory process.42 As the Court held, “the choice made between
proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies
primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”43
37. Adjudication is concerned with the determination of past and present rights and liabilities.
Normally, there is a decision as to whether past conduct was unlawful, so that the proceeding is
characterized by an accusatory flavor and may result in disciplinary action. Or, it may involve the
determination of a person’s right to benefits under existing law so that the issues relate to whether
they are within the established category of persons entitled to such benefits. ATT’Y GEN.’S
MANUAL, supra note 13, at 14–15; see also Bowen, 488 U.S. at 216–17 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“Adjudication—the process for formulating orders . . . —has future as well as past legal
consequences, since the principles announced in an adjudication cannot be departed from in future
adjudications without reason.” (internal citation omitted)).
38. See, e.g., Neustar, Inc. v. FCC, 857 F.3d 886, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that agency
action was adjudication because “the Order under review determined the rights and obligations of
two parties” and “applied existing rules and regulations” to determine the winner of a contract “in
a fact-intensive determination that occurred on a case-by-case basis”).
39. See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947); NLRB v. WymanGordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764–66 (1969) (plurality opinion); Bowen, 488 U.S. at 221.
40. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
41. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, supra note 30, at 1418–19, 1418 n.120 (describing Judge
Friendly’s frustration with the National Labor Relations Board’s failure to engage in rulemaking,
while still enforcing its orders). But see Katie R. Eyer, Administrative Adjudication and the Rule of
Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 647, 649–51, 649 n.4 (2008) (responding to “more than a half century” of
“sustained academic critique” and arguing that “adjudicative lawmaking theoretically has the
potential to further a number of important rule-of-law goals”).
42. Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 203.
43. Id. at 203. Agencies have many incentives to make policy through informal mechanisms
or individual adjudications, freed from the burdens of having to solicit and consider the viewpoints
of all interested parties. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. 345,
348 (2019) (criticizing, among other things, “[t]he judicially imposed rigors of notice-and-comment
rulemaking”). Some agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), must use even more
burdensome formal rulemaking procedures and almost exclusively implement policy via
enforcement actions. See, e.g., Elysa M. Dishman, Settling Data Protection Law: Multistate Actions
and National Policymaking, 72 ALA. L. REV. 839, 842, 842 n.16 (2021) (explaining that the FTC
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C. Maryland Law—Quasi-Legislative and Quasi-Judicial Actions
Although the Maryland APA does not define the terms “quasi-judicial”
and “quasi-legislative,” the Maryland Open Meetings Act does.44 A quasilegislative function is “the process or act of . . . adopting, disapproving,
amending, or repealing a rule, regulation, or bylaw that has the force of law,
including a rule of a court; . . . approving, disapproving, or amending a
budget; . . . or approving, disapproving, or amending a contract.”45 A quasijudicial function means “a determination of . . . a contested case; . . . a
proceeding before an administrative agency for which Title 7, Chapter 200
of the Maryland Rules would govern judicial review; . . . or a complaint by
the [Open Meetings Law Compliance] Board.”46
Maryland courts have also written extensively on the distinction
between quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative actions. The test is whether a
decision “is one making a new law—an enactment of general application
prescribing as new plan or policy—or is one which merely looks to or
facilitates the administration, execution, or implementation of a law already
in force and effect.”47 Maryland courts also emphasize the nature of an
agency’s decision-making process in evaluating the type of action. For
instance, a quasi-judicial decision is one that is “reached on individual, as
opposed to general, grounds, and scrutinizes a single property . . . and
[where] there is a deliberative fact-finding process with testimony and the
weighing of evidence.”48
The parameters of judicial review under both federal and Maryland law
depend on whether an agency acted in a rulemaking/quasi-legislative or
adjudicative/quasi-judicial capacity. But federal and state courts look to
different factors to categorize a particular agency action. Federal law places
great emphasis on an act’s prospective or retrospective effect, whereas
does not use “rulemaking to regulate data practices” because its rulemaking authority “is so
procedurally burdensome that it is largely ineffective”); cf. Rohit Chopra & Lina M. Khan, The
Case for “Unfair Methods of Competition” Rulemaking, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 369 (2020)
(explaining that, unlike the hurdles that apply to its “unfair or deceptive acts or practices”
rulemaking authority, “the FTC has authority to engage in participatory rulemaking” to interpret
“unfair methods of competition” and criticizing the FTC for not exercising that authority).
44. The Maryland Open Meetings Act is a statute within the General Provisions article of the
Annotated Code which requires certain State bodies to hold public meetings. See MD. CODE ANN.,
GEN. PROVISIONS § 3-301 (West 2022). Although it is distinct from the Maryland APA, the two
overlap in the sense that they both spell out certain procedural rules for how agencies operate.
Federal law contains the analogous Federal Sunshine Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 552b.
45. MD. GEN. PROVISIONS § 3-101(j) (West 2022).
46. Id. § 3-101(i). Contested cases are discussed infra at Section II.B.1.a.
47. Md. Bd. of Pub. Works v. K. Hovnanian’s Four Seasons at Kent Island, LLC, 425 Md. 482,
514, 42 A.3d 40, 59 (2012).
48. Id. at 515, 42 A.2d at 59.
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Maryland law stresses the character of the decision-making process that led
to the act: “[T]he greater a decisionmaker’s reliance on general, ‘legislative
facts,’ the more likely it is that an action is legislative in nature. Likewise,
the greater a decision-maker’s reliance on property-specific, ‘adjudicative
facts,’ the more reasonable it is to term the action adjudicatory in nature.”49
Because these different formulations would appear to give Maryland
agencies less flexibility than federal agencies in how they announce rules of
general applicability, one would expect the Chenery II doctrine to exist, if at
all, only in a weaker form in Maryland jurisprudence. But the Maryland
Court of Appeals has embraced Chenery II, while only occasionally
suggesting certain limitations.50 Whether Maryland’s articulation of the
rulemaking–adjudication dichotomy and its approach to Chenery has any
practical effect—on either Maryland agencies’ selection of one form of
policymaking over another in a particular instance or the success of
challenges to that selection—remains an unsettled question.
II. OBTAINING JUDICIAL REVIEW AND IDENTIFYING THE APPROPRIATE
STANDARD
Obtaining judicial review of an agency action isn’t as straightforward as
appellate court review of a trial court action. Even deciding when an agency
action is complete can be challenging.51 Agencies may keep a rulemaking
docket open for years, drag their feet in implementing a statutory mandate,
or prescribe elaborate internal review processes before a decision is finalized.
These are just a few scenarios where an aggrieved party may lack clarity on
when they are entitled to judicial review. And once an agency action is
properly before the court, the court will review it for compliance with
statutory procedural and substantive requirements. There may even be a
category of agency actions that a court may be unable (or unwilling) to review
altogether.

49. Talbot Cnty. v. Miles Point Prop., LLC, 415 Md. 372, 387, 2 A.3d 344, 353 (2010).
50. See, e.g., Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 305 Md. 145, 168, 501 A.2d
1307, 1319 (1986) (citing Chenery II as “a well settled principle of administrative law”); CBS Inc.
v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 319 Md. 687, 693–99, 575 A.2d 324, 327–30 (1990)
(acknowledging Chenery II but suggesting it would follow a narrower interpretation, invalidating a
decision of the Comptroller to “announce a substantially new generally applicable policy” in an
adjudication and retroactively apply that policy to the company before it); Md. Ins. Comm’r v. Cent.
Acceptance Corp., 424 Md. 1, 31, 33 A.3d 949, 967 (2011) (applying Chenery II and holding that
“CBS is confined . . . to situations where the agency’s adjudication changed substantially the
application or effect of an existing law or regulation, not to an agency’s interpretation of a standalone statute.”).
51. See infra Section II.A.
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As explained below, Maryland and federal courts have articulated—and
perhaps implemented—different approaches to several of these important
issues, reflecting different philosophies regarding the respective roles of the
courts and the agencies created by the political branches.
A. The Finality and Exhaustion Requirements (or Not)
Finality and exhaustion are two threshold requirements for obtaining
judicial review of both Maryland and federal agency decisions, designed to
give agencies a full opportunity to complete their decision-making processes.
Though closely related, finality and exhaustion are distinct concepts:52
[T]he finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial
decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that
inflicts an actual, concrete injury; the exhaustion requirement
generally refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which
an injured party may seek review of an adverse decision and obtain
a remedy . . . .53
Maryland and federal courts employ essentially the same standard for
when an agency action is final,54 though they articulate it slightly differently.
Under federal law, to be final, an action must (1) “mark the consummation
of the agency’s decisionmaking process” and “not be of a merely tentative or
interlocutory nature”; and (2) be an action “by which rights or obligations
have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.”55 Under
Maryland law, a decision is final when it “dispose[s] of the case by deciding
all question[s] of law and fact and leave[s] nothing further for the
administrative body to decide.”56
Even after an agency action is final, a party might still be required to
pursue additional remedies within the agency—such as seeking
52. Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 144 (1993) (“We have recognized that the judicial
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is conceptually distinct from the doctrine of
finality . . . .”); Priester v. Baltimore County, 232 Md. App. 178, 193, 157 A.3d 301, 310 (2017)
(“The rule of finality overlaps the rule of exhaustion.”).
53. Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172,
193 (1985), overruled on other grounds by Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
54. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (allowing courts to review “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute
and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court”); Willis v.
Montgomery County, 415 Md. 523, 534, 3 A.3d 448, 455 (2010) (“As a general rule, an action for
judicial review of an administrative order will lie only if the administrative order is final.” (quoting
Holiday Spas v. Montgomery Cnty. Hum. Rels. Comm’n, 315 Md. 390, 395, 554 A.2d 1197, 1199
(1989))).
55. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Port
of Bos. Marine Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).
56. Willis, 415 Md. at 535, 3 A.3d at 455–56. A petitioner cannot seek interlocutory review of
an agency decision—even one alleged to be ultra vires or illegal—absent statutory authorization.
Priester, 232 Md. App. at 195, 157 A.3d at 311.
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reconsideration or appealing a bureau-level decision to a full agency—before
pursuing relief in the courts. Exhaustion requirements can be statutory57 or
court-made,58 but where a statute spells out specific criteria for appealability,
courts may not impose further exhaustion requirements.59 Thus, because the
Federal APA provides that “final agency action” is “subject to judicial
review”60 and that an agency action is final “whether or not there has been
presented or determined an application for a declaratory order, for any form
of reconsideration, or . . . to superior agency authority,”61 the Supreme Court
has held that “[w]hen an aggrieved party has exhausted all administrative
remedies expressly prescribed by statute or agency rule, the agency action is
[final and appealable].”62 Agencies may occasionally attempt to impose
additional exhaustion requirements beyond those set forth in their codified
regulations, but courts are generally unreceptive to such arguments.63
Maryland administrative law also contains an exhaustion requirement,
which is “[i]ntertwined with the doctrine of the separation of powers”64
embodied in the Maryland Constitution,65 and which courts treat “like a
jurisdictional issue.”66 Under Maryland’s version of the exhaustion rule,
“[w]hen a legislature provides an administrative remedy as the exclusive or
primary means by which an aggrieved party may challenge a government
action,” an aggrieved party must “exhaust the prescribed process of
57. See Peter A. Devlin, Note, Jurisdiction, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, and
Constitutional Claims, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1234, 1239 (2018).
58. See Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 144–45 (1993) (“Whether courts are free to impose
an exhaustion requirement as a matter of judicial discretion depends, at least in part, on whether
Congress has provided otherwise . . . .”); William Funk, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies—
New Dimensions Since Darby, 18 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 1, 6 (2000) (discussing availability of courtmade exhaustion requirements in APA and non-APA contexts).
59. Darby, 509 U.S. at 143.
60. 5 U.S.C. § 704.
61. Id.
62. Darby, 509 U.S. at 146.
63. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992) (“[W]here Congress has not
clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs.”); cf. Funk, supra note 58, at 10–11
(describing the case law regarding exceptions to agency exhaustion requirements in APA cases as
“hopelessly confused”). Though separate from exhaustion, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
provides one means for a court with proper jurisdiction to nonetheless defer to an agency decisionmaking process. See generally City of Osceola v. Entergy Ark., Inc., 791 F.3d 904, 908–09 (8th
Cir. 2015) (noting the doctrine and briefly discussing relevant case law).
64. Montgomery Cnty. Off. of Child Support Enf’t ex rel. Cohen v. Cohen, 238 Md. App. 315,
334, 192 A.3d 788, 799 (2018).
65. MD. CONST., DECLARATION OF RTS. art. 8.
66. Priester v. Baltimore County, 232 Md. App. 178, 190, 157 A.3d 301, 308 (2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Bd. of Educ. v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 787, 506 A.2d 625, 631 (1986)
(“While the failure to invoke and exhaust an administrative remedy does not ordinarily result in a
trial court’s being deprived of fundamental jurisdiction, nevertheless, because of the public policy
involved, the matter is for some purposes treated like a jurisdictional question.”).
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administrative remedies before seeking” other remedies or invoking the
jurisdiction of the court.67 The rule overlaps with the requirement for a final
agency decision by requiring a party to wait “until he or she receives a final
decision from the agency at the utmost level of the administrative
hierarchy.”68
Maryland cases recognize five exceptions to the general exhaustion
requirement: (1) when the legislature has indicated exhaustion is not a
requirement; (2) when there is a direct attack on the power of the legislature
to enact the legislation from which relief is sought; (3) when an agency
requires a party to follow—“in a manner and to a degree that is significant”—
an unauthorized procedure; (4) when the agency cannot provide a remedy “to
any substantial degree”; and (5) when the object of a judicial proceeding only
tangentially or incidentally concerns matters that the agency was created to
solve, and does not in a meaningful way call for the application of the
agency’s expertise.69 There is also a statutory exception to the exhaustion
requirement: Any person may “file a petition for declaratory judgment” to
challenge “the validity of any regulation, whether or not the person has asked
the [agency] to consider the validity of the regulation.”70
When these exceptions are viewed as a whole, two themes emerge:
Maryland courts do not require exhaustion either when an agency action is in
some way unlawful, or when judicial intervention would not interfere with
an agency’s ability to operate within its area of expertise. As we will see,
these two concerns—correcting illegal agency actions while deferring to
agency expertise—also animate courts’ substantive review of agency
actions.71

67. Priester, 232 Md. App. at 193, 157 A.3d at 310.
68. Id. at 194, 157 A.3d at 310 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 201 n.16, 157 A.3d at 314–15 n.16 (citing Prince George’s County v. Blumberg, 288
Md. 275, 418 A.2d 1155 (1980)). The Court of Special Appeals, however, has noted that one of
these exceptions—the “unauthorized procedure exception . . . has very limited viability today,”
Priester, 232 Md. App. at 202, 157 A.3d at 315, and the Court of Appeals has described the
exception as “dicta” that is “supported by the citation of only one case,” suggesting that the
“unauthorized procedure” exception may not exist at all. Md. Comm’n on Hum. Rels. v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 295 Md. 586, 594 n.10, 457 A.2d 1146, 1150 n.10 (1983). Indeed, it would be curious
if challenges to an unlawful procedure were exempt from the exhaustion requirement, because one
of the statutory bases for seeking judicial review is if an agency decision “results from an unlawful
procedure.” MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-222(h)(3)(iii) (West 2022). That provision
appears alongside other bases for judicial review that are not exempt from exhaustion, and nothing
in the statute suggests it is singled out for special treatment. See id.
70. STATE GOV’T § 10-125(a)(1).
71. See infra Sections II.B, III.B.
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Challenges to an agency’s delay or inaction in the face of a petition for
agency action or a statutory mandate present special difficulties of finality.72
Environmental legislation, for example, often mandates agency action by
specified deadlines,73 and agencies may impose deadlines on themselves.74
The Federal APA provides for judicial review to “compel agency
action . . . unreasonably delayed.”75 But absent a missed deadline or
evidence of a “pattern of inaction,”76 federal courts are likely to be
“circumspect” in reviewing an agency’s failure to act.77 As a practical matter,
even where inaction is reviewable, the most likely relief is not a mandate to
rule in the petitioner’s favor, but a remand for prompt consideration.
Maryland courts, on the other hand, have held that agency inaction is
just as subject to judicial review under the courts’ inherent authority as
agency action. The Court of Appeals of Maryland recognizes that “a court’s
inherent power of judicial review, under appropriate circumstances, may
reach an administrative agency’s inaction as well as its action,” and that
“[w]hen an agency . . . fails to act on a matter committed to its discretion by
. . . statute, there is as much aggrievement and potential for abuse or prejudice
as when an agency affirmatively announces an adverse decision.”78 This
language suggests that Maryland law has a greater predilection for reviewing
agency inaction than federal law. It is also consistent with the broader theme,
present throughout Maryland administrative law, that courts possess inherent
authority to review certain types of agency conduct. As we discuss
throughout, this notion that courts have some irreducible minimum of
authority to review agency actions is one of the most significant conceptual
differences between Maryland and federal judicial review.

72. See, e.g., Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Norton, 324 F.3d 1229, 1237–38 (11th Cir.
2003) (collecting cases).
73. See, e.g., Daniel P. Selmi, Jurisdiction to Review Agency Inaction under Federal
Environmental Law, 72 IND. L.J. 65, 131, 131 n.304 (1996).
74. See, e.g., Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80–81 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(retaining jurisdiction over unresolved matters pending before the FCC where the Commission
“fail[ed] to meet its self-declared prior deadlines” and directing the Commission to file regular
progress reports with the court of appeals).
75. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1); see also id. § 551(13) (defining “agency action” to include the “failure
to act”).
76. Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n, 324 F.3d at 1238.
77. Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr., 750 F.2d at 79.
78. Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 276–77, 884 A.2d 1171, 1191 (2005).
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B. Methods of Review—How the Different Kinds of Agency Action Get
Before Courts and the Standards that Apply
1. Maryland Law
Judicial review of an agency decision can be obtained by statute where
available. Absent an explicit statutory right of review, it can be obtained via
courts’ inherent powers by bringing an original action such as a declaratory
judgment action or a writ of mandamus.79
All judicial review proceedings in Maryland begin in the circuit court.
This requirement is a matter of constitutional law, because, under the
Maryland Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland is exclusively appellate.80 Judicial review of
agency decisions is, therefore, technically “an exercise of original
jurisdiction and not of appellate jurisdiction.”81
a. Quasi-Judicial
The Maryland APA only provides for judicial review of “contested
case[s],”82 which are formal hearings before agencies.83 Not all hearings are
contested cases; to meet the definition, the hearing must be required by law.
If a statute or regulation does not expressly require an agency to hold a
hearing consistent with the provisions of the Maryland APA, a proceeding
will not be considered a contested case, even if it bears certain hallmarks
79. Armstrong v. Mayor of Baltimore, 169 Md. App. 655, 666, 906 A.2d 415, 421–22 (2006)
(citing Crim. Injs. Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 500, 331 A.2d 55 (1975)). Similar devices
were developed at common law for review of government actions prior to the adoption of the
Federal and state APAs. See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review I, 71 HARV. L. REV.
401, 403 (1958) (“When Lord Holt finally established in 1700 the power to review official action
by certiorari and mandamus his decision was simply one aspect of the limits set upon monarchy.”);
John J. Coughlin, The History of the Judicial Review of Administrative Power and the Future of
Regulatory Governance, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 89, 92 (2001) (“Traditionally, judicial review has
afforded an important check on the exercise of administrative power.”).
80. Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 276 Md. 36, 41, 343 A.2d 521, 524 (1975);
Edward A. Tomlinson, The Maryland Administrative Procedure Act: Forty Years Old in 1997, 56
MD. L. REV. 196, 217 (1997).
81. Shell Oil, 276 Md. at 43, 343 A.2d at 525.
82. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-222 (West 2022); see also MD. RULE 7-201
(governing actions for judicial review where authorized by statute).
83. Specifically, a contested case involves a “proceeding before an agency to determine” either:
(1) “a right, duty, statutory entitlement, or privilege of a person that is required by statute or
constitution to be determined only after an opportunity for an agency hearing”; or (2) “the grant,
denial, renewal, revocation, suspension, or amendment of a license that is required by statute or
constitution to be determined only after an opportunity for an agency hearing.” STATE GOV’T
§ 10-202(d)(1). A contested case does not include an agency hearing required only by regulation
unless the regulation specifies that the hearing must be held in accordance with the Maryland APA.
Id. § 10-202(d)(2).

2022] HOW COURTS REVIEW ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY ACTIONS

1239

such as reviewing facts and in-person interviews.84 Likewise, even
subsequent proceedings following a contested case—such as a decision to
reinstate a license that was previously revoked—are not themselves contested
cases unless there is a statutory or regulatory requirement for an APAcompliant hearing.85
Since this type of formal hearing is only a small portion of the work
agencies do, judicial review would be significantly limited if it were only
available in this narrow category of cases. Fortunately, this is not the case,
as courts have always possessed inherent authority to review quasi-judicial
decisions absent statutory authority, and the Maryland Rules have been
amended to codify that power.86 Invoking the principle that the legislature
cannot divest courts of their inherent power to review arbitrary, illegal, or
capricious agency actions,87 the Court of Appeals has long recognized that
“[c]ourts have the inherent power, through the writ of mandamus, by
injunction, or otherwise,” to review agency decisions without express
statutory authority, and that “[w]here the statute or ordinance makes no
provision for judicial review, an implied limitation upon an administrative
board’s authority is that its decisions be supported by facts and that they be
not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.”88 And, in 2006, an “administrative
mandamus” procedure was added to the Maryland Rules to govern judicial
review of all quasi-judicial decisions for which there is no explicit statutory
review procedure.89 Under Maryland Rule 7-401(a), administrative
mandamus is available for “a quasi-judicial order or action of an
administrative agency where review is not expressly authorized by law.”90
Statutory review of contested cases and administrative mandamus are
both initiated by filing a petition for judicial review, governed by Maryland

84. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Md. State Bd. of Physicians, No. 1465, 2021 WL 5706857, at *3
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 1, 2021) (holding that the Board decision on reinstatement of physician’s
license was not a contested case—and thus that petitioner did not have a statutory right of review—
because there was no requirement of a hearing in accordance with the Maryland APA); STATE
GOV’T § 10-202(d)(2) (providing that even where an agency’s regulation requires a hearing, the
proceeding will not be considered a contested case unless the regulation expressly or by clear
implication requires the hearing to be held in accordance with the Maryland APA).
85. Greenberg, 2021 WL 5706857, at *5–6.
86. MD. RULE 7-401.
87. See infra notes 178–181 and accompanying text.
88. Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 379–80, 45 A.2d 73, 76 (1945); see also Reese v. Dep’t of
Health and Mental Hygiene, 177 Md. App. 102, 144 n.21, 934 A.2d 1009, 1033–34 n.21 (2007)
(explaining non-statutory judicial review of adjudicative decision-making).
89. See MD. RULE 7-401(a); see also Talbot County v. Miles Point Prop., LLC, 415 Md. 372,
394, 2 A.3d 344, 357 (2010) (discussing history of administrative mandamus).
90. MD. RULE 7-401(a).
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Rules 7-202 and 7-203.91 Review of a contested case must be brought in the
circuit court for a county in which any party resides or has a principal place
of business,92 whereas the administrative mandamus rules do not contain an
explicit venue provision, and simply require the petition to be filed in “a
circuit court authorized to provide the review.”93
A circuit court’s powers are essentially the same whether reviewing an
action under the Maryland APA or a petition for administrative mandamus.
Both procedures allow a court to set aside an action that is unconstitutional;
exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency or
decisionmaker; results from an unlawful procedure; is affected by any error
of law; is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in
light of the entire record; or is arbitrary or capricious.94 The administrative
mandamus rules also allow a court to overturn an agency action if it is an
abuse of discretion,95 and the Maryland APA allows a court to set aside a
decision in a contested case involving termination of employment or
employee discipline if the agency “fails to reasonably state the basis for the
termination or the nature and extent of the penalty.”96
Judicial review of a quasi-judicial determination is narrow: A court’s
role is “limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as
a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine
if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of
law.”97 When reviewing an agency’s findings of fact, courts apply the
substantial evidence standard, which requires them to “defer[] to the facts
91. See MD. RULE 7-202–7-203 (governing administrative review proceedings); MD. RULE 7402(a) (requiring mandamus petition to comply with Rules 7-202 and 7-203).
92. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-222(c) (West 2022).
93. MD. RULE 7-202(a). In some contested cases, an administrative law judge, acting out of
the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”), may have taken the final action that leads to a
petition for judicial review. However, for judicial-review purposes, the relevant agency is not the
OAH, but the agency that made the underlying decision that OAH reviewed. Brown v. Wash.
Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 250 Md. App. 531, 537, 250 A.3d 1117, 1120 (2021). That agency—
not the OAH and not the petitioner—is responsible for transmitting the record to the circuit court
when a petition for judicial review has been filed. MD. RULE 7-206(d); Brown, 250 Md. App. at
536, 250 A.3d at 1119.
94. Compare STATE GOV’T § 10-222(h)(3)(i)–(v), (vii) (contested case), with MD. RULE 7403(A)–(F) (administrative mandamus).
95. MD. RULE 7-403(G). This is a significant inclusion, because the Court of Appeals has
clarified that section 10-222(h) of the State Government Article does not permit courts to review
decisions for abuse of discretion. See Md. Transp. Auth. v. King, 369 Md. 274, 290, 799 A.2d 1246,
1255 (2002) (noting that “[n]either the Administrative Procedure Act nor general Maryland
administrative law principles authorize” abuse-of-discretion review).
96. STATE GOV’T § 10-222(h)(3)(vi).
97. Md. Aviation Admin. v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 571, 873 A.2d 1145, 1154 (2005) (quoting
United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. People’s Couns. for Balt. City, 336 Md. 569, 577, 650 A.2d 226, 230
(1994)).
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found and inferences drawn by the agency when the record supports those
findings and inferences.”98 In conducting this review, the court decides
“whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual
conclusion the agency reached,”99 and a court defers to the agency’s fact
finding and inferences if they are supported by the record.100 Agencies’
findings are prima facie correct, and are reviewed in the light most favorable
to the agency.101
For matters committed to agency discretion, reviewing courts apply the
arbitrary and capricious standard,102 which, although highly dependent on
context, is “extremely deferential” to the agency.103 Under arbitrary and
capricious review, “generally the question is whether the agency exercised
its discretion ‘unreasonably or without a rational basis.’”104 And, “[d]espite
some unfortunate language that has crept into a few . . . opinions, a court’s
task on review is not to substitute its judgment for the expertise of those
persons who constitute the administrative agency.”105 Arbitrary and
capricious review under the Maryland APA “do[es] not include
disproportionality or abuse of discretion.”
As long as an administrative sanction or decision does not exceed
the agency’s authority . . . and is supported by competent . . .
evidence, there can be no judicial reversal or modification of the
decision based on disproportionality or abuse of discretion unless
[it was] so extreme and egregious that the reviewing court can
properly deem the decision to be “arbitrary or capricious.”106

98. Md. Dep’t of the Env’t v. Cnty. Comm’rs (MDOE), 465 Md. 169, 201, 214 A.3d 61, 81
(2019).
99. Noland, 386 Md. at 571, 873 A.2d at 1154 (citations omitted) (quoting Bulluck v. Pelham
Wood Apts., 283 Md. 505, 512, 390 A.2d 1119, 1123 (1978)).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. MDOE, 465 Md. at 202, 214 A.3d at 81.
103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 297, 884 A.2d 1171, 1204 (2005)).
105. Md. Aviation Admin. v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 571–72, 873 A.2d 1145, 1154 (2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United Parcel Service, Inc. v. People’s Couns. for Balt.
City, 336 Md. 569, 576–77, 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994)). A corollary of the rule that courts do not
substitute their judgment for the agency’s is the rule that courts cannot affirm an agency’s decision
except based on the agency’s findings and the reasons stated by the agency. United Steelworkers
of Am. AFL-CIO, Local 2610 v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 298 Md. 665, 679, 472 A.2d 62, 69 (1984).
This is in accord with federal practice, see SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943),
though it stands in contrast to judicial review of trial court decisions, where appellate courts will
sustain a judgment for any reason apparent on the record, whether or not it was expressly relied on
by the trial court. United Steelworkers, 298 Md. at 679, 472 A.2d at 69.
106. Md. Transp. Auth. v. King, 369 Md. 274, 291, 799 A.2d 1246, 1255–56 (2002).
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Thus, all quasi-judicial decisions—whether or not the result of a formal
hearing—are reviewed under essentially the same standards. And while there
are multiple enumerated bases for reversing a quasi-judicial decision, they all
ultimately boil down to whether the agency acted with legal authority or
based its decision on facts that are not supported by the record.
b. Quasi-Legislative
Quasi-legislative actions are challenged through a declaratory judgment
action or other invocation of the circuit court’s inherent authority. “A person
may file a petition for a declaratory judgment on the validity of any
regulation, whether or not the person has asked the [agency] to consider the
validity of the regulation.”107 Although section 10-125 only applies to
“regulation[s],” the Maryland APA defines “regulation” broadly to
encompass any “statement or . . . amendment or repeal of a statement”
including a guideline, rule, standard, statement of interpretation, or statement
of policy.108 This definition would appear to capture almost any action that
could be considered quasi-legislative.
An action under section 10-125 must be brought in “the circuit court for
the county where the petitioner resides or has a principal place of
business.”109 The court “may determine the validity of any regulation if it
appears to the court that the regulation or its threatened application interferes
with or impairs or threatens to interfere with or impair a legal right or
privilege of the petitioner.”110 Specifically, the court “shall declare a
provision of a regulation invalid if [it] finds that” (1) the regulation “violates
any provision of the United States or Maryland Constitution”; (2) the
regulation “exceeds the [agency’s] statutory authority”; or (3) “the [agency]
failed to comply with statutory requirements” for adopting the regulation.111
At the same time, Maryland courts have also held that quasi-legislative
actions are “subject to court review, by invoking the court’s original
jurisdiction . . . through the writ of mandamus, by injunction, [by]

107. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-125(a)(1) (West 2022). Notably, section 10-125 relief
is unavailable for regulations of certain executive agencies. See id. § 10-120. One of the agencies
listed is the Public Service Commission. Id. § 10-120(a)(6). However, since 2004, Public Service
Commission regulations are reviewable under section 10-215, “[n]otwithstanding § 10-120 of the
State Government Article.” MD. CODE ANN, PUB. UTIL. § 3-201(a) (West 2022); see also Sprenger
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 171 Md. App. 444, 450 n.3, 910 A.2d 544, 548 n.3 (2006) (noting 2004
change in statute).
108. STATE GOV’T § 10-101(g)(1).
109. Id. § 10-125(a)(2).
110. Id. § 10-125(b).
111. Id. § 10-125(d).
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declaratory action, or by certiorari.”112 Of these options, courts have
specifically recognized declaratory actions under Courts and Judicial
Proceedings section 3-403 as appropriate to challenge agency regulations.113
Review of quasi-legislative actions under the court’s inherent power is
limited to whether the agency “was acting within the scope of its statutory
authority,”114 which courts have also articulated as whether the agency “was
acting within its legal boundaries.”115
Therefore, while State Government section 10-125 provides a specific
mechanism for challenging regulations, it is not the exclusive mechanism.116
However, judicial review is functionally the same whether brought under
section 10-125 or more generally through the court’s inherent power. While
inherent authority review is limited to whether the agency exceeded its
authority, the statutory bases for invalidating a regulation are essentially the
same: whether the regulation violates the Constitution, the regulation exceeds
the agency’s authority, or the agency failed to comply with statutory
requirements for adopting the provision.117 Courts have applied the “legal
boundaries” standard that applies for inherent authority review to
proceedings brought under section 10-125 as well.118
112. See, e.g., Bethel World Outreach Church v. Montgomery County, 184 Md. App. 572, 597,
967 A.2d 232, 247 (2009) (quoting Armstrong v. Mayor of Baltimore, 169 Md. App. 655, 667, 906
A.2d 415, 422 (2006)). The Court of Appeals’ decision in Talbot County v. Miles Point Property,
415 Md. 372, 2 A.3d 344 (2010), however, casts doubt on whether common law mandamus can
ever be available to challenge an agency’s legislative functions. The Court noted that mandamus
only applies to “ministerial” acts and only when “an official’s duties are absolute, certain, and
imperative, involving merely the execution of a set task,” and thus “does not lie” when a body is
“acting in a legislative capacity, and not a ministerial one.” Id. at 397–98, 2 A.3d at 359 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting James v. Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 315, 326, 418 A.2d
1173, 1179 (1980)). It appears uncontroversial, however, that a declaratory judgment action is an
appropriate vehicle for challenging quasi-legislative administrative acts. Dugan v. Prince George’s
County, 216 Md. App. 650, 659 n.13, 88 A.3d 896, 902 n.13 (2014) (“A declaratory judgment action
is appropriate when there is no judicial review by statute and the action was quasi-legislative in
nature . . . .”).
113. See, e.g., Christ ex rel. Christ v. Md. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 335 Md. 427, 433 n.5, 644 A.2d
34, 36 n.5 (1994) (“The plaintiff’s action is generally authorized by the Maryland Uniform
Declaratory Judgment Act . . . and more specifically by the Maryland Administrative Procedure
Act, . . . [State Government] § 10-125 . . . .”); see also Oyarzo v. Md. Dep’t of Health & Mental
Hygiene, 187 Md. App. 264, 272, 978 A.2d 804, 809 (2009) (identifying Declaratory Judgment Act
and section 10-125 as sources of the court’s jurisdiction).
114. Lewis v. Gansler, 204 Md. App. 454, 473, 42 A.3d 63, 75 (2012).
115. Bethel World Outreach Church, 184 Md. App. at 597, 967 A.2d at 247.
116. See supra notes 112–115 and accompanying text.
117. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-125(d) (West 2022).
118. See, e.g., Medstar Health v. Md. Health Care Comm’n, 376 Md. 1, 20–21, 827 A.2d 83, 95
(2003) (“Pursuant to State Government Article, § 10-125, . . . [o]ur scope of review . . . is limited
to assessing whether the agency was acting within its legal boundaries.” (footnote omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Adventist v. Suburban, 350 Md. 104, 124, 711 A.2d 158, 167
(1998))).
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As later sections of this Article will show,119 the differential treatment
of quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative decisions is one of the significant
distinctions between Maryland and federal administrative review. Whereas
judicial review of quasi-legislative decisions under Maryland law is “so
narrow that it may be inappropriate to describe it as ‘judicial review,’” federal
judicial review statutes apply the same procedural requirements for appeal
and standards of review to all final agency actions.120 Of course, federal law
distinguishes between adjudications and rulemakings in critical ways—
certain standards of review under the Federal APA depend on the type of
action being challenged, and the procedure for seeking review can likewise
vary for different kinds of agency decisions—but these procedural nuances
do not reflect the same kind of structural division that Maryland law
embodies. The more important distinctions between rulemakings and
adjudications under the Federal APA relate to the substance of an agency’s
decision and the merits of an appeal.
2. Federal Law
Like in Maryland, review of a federal agency decision can be either
statutory or non-statutory.121 Under federal law, however, a complex
patchwork of statutes provides the basis for review. Although the Federal
APA establishes procedures for judicial review, it does not confer subjectmatter jurisdiction or create a right of action.122 Thus, although the Federal
APA provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action . . . is entitled to
judicial review thereof,”123 they must generally look to the organic statute of
the specific agency whose action they are challenging to determine the
mechanism for seeking that review.124 In particular, an agency’s organic
statute determines the venue and timing for a judicial review proceeding.

119. See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
120. See Tomlinson, supra note 80, at 199, 214 (describing the APA as prescribing “a unitary
system of review applicable to all final agency action”).
121. ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S. & AM. BAR ASS’N, Judicial Review of Agency Action, FED.
ADMIN.
PROC.
SOURCEBOOK
(2021),
https://sourcebook.acus.gov/wiki/Judicial_Review_of_Agency_Action/view [hereinafter Judical
Review of Agency Action]. Arguably, a distinct third type of review is judicial review of an
enforcement action. Id.
122. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977).
123. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
124. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e) (providing for review of FTC actions); 47 U.S.C. § 402
(providing for review of FCC actions).
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Often, federal law provides for review directly in the federal courts of
appeals,125 or even one specific court of appeals.126
a. APA Review
Where judicial review of federal agency decisions is permitted, the
Federal APA authorizes a reviewing court to “hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions” of law127—without distinguishing
between rulemaking and adjudication—that the court finds to be (1)
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law”; (2) “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immunity”; (3) “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations,
or short of statutory right”; or (4) “without observance of procedure required
by law.”128 In formal agency hearings, a court can set aside a decision if it
was not supported by substantial evidence.129
The Federal APA’s judicial review criteria largely overlap with the
criteria for review of quasi-judicial decisions spelled out under Maryland
law.130 However, unlike the limited enumerated bases for reviewing quasijudicial actions under Maryland law, the Federal APA provides for the same
general standards of review of both rulemakings and adjudications (with the
noteworthy substantial evidence standard applicable to formal adjudication).
With respect to rulemaking (or quasi-legislative acts), federal and Maryland
law thus differ in a significant respect: Maryland courts can only set aside an
agency’s quasi-legislative action when the agency exceeded its legal

125. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (providing for review of certain FCC decisions in “[t]he court
of appeals”).
126. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 2342 gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction over certain
decisions of a handful of agencies including the FCC, the Departments of Agriculture and
Transportation, and the Atomic Energy Commission. Venue for those proceedings is in the circuit
where the petitioner resides or has its principal office, or in the D.C. Circuit. Id. § 2343. Other
statutes, however, sometimes allow for review only in the D.C. Circuit. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 4915(a) (providing for appeals of EPA and FAA decisions exclusively in D.C. Circuit); 47 U.S.C.
§ 402(b) (providing for review of certain enumerated types of FCC decisions in D.C. Circuit). The
timing for filing a petition for review (and even the name of the petition to be filed) can also vary
by agency or type of decision. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (providing sixty days to file petition for
review), with 47 U.S.C. § 402(b), (c) (providing thirty days to file notice of appeal).
127. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
128. Id. § 706(2)(A)–(D). In making these determinations, however, § 706 cautions courts that
“due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.” Id. § 706.
129. Id. § 706(2)(E). A final, rarely invoked provision, § 706(2)(F), allows for de novo review
of factual findings when an agency’s factfinding procedures are inadequate or “when issues that
were not before the agency are raised in a proceeding to enforce nonadjudicatory agency action.”
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971), abrogated by Califano
v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
130. See supra Section II.B.1.a.
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authority,131 whereas in federal administrative review, exceeding an agency’s
authority is one of several bases for reversal.132
Though the Federal APA differs significantly from the Maryland APA
by applying the same standards of review for challenges to rulemakings and
adjudications, the rulemaking/adjudication distinction remains critical, even
case dispositive in federal administrative appeals. Though it does not
determine the standard of review as it does under Maryland law, the
dichotomy dictates what procedures the agency was required to follow to
reach that decision.133
b. APA Rulemaking Exceptions
As we have explained, an important aspect of review of agency
rulemaking is ascertaining whether the agency followed the notice-andcomment procedures set forth in the APA. Yet the Federal APA carves out
several important areas—interpretive rules; general policy statements;
internal agency organization and policies; rules for which prior notice and
comment would be “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest”;134 agency management and personnel; matters relating to public
131. See supra notes 114–118 and accompanying text.
132. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (allowing reversal of decision “in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations”); see, e.g., Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 487
F.2d 342, 350 (2d Cir. 1973) (“While we still have a feeling that there may be cases where an
adjudicative determination not supported by substantial evidence . . . would not be regarded as
arbitrary or capricious, . . . in the review of rules of general applicability made after notice and
comment rulemaking, the two criteria do tend to converge.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted));
Richard A. Posner, What Is Obviously Wrong with the Federal Judiciary, Yet Eminently Curable
Part I, 19 GREEN BAG 2D 187, 198 (2016) (“There are multiple standards for deciding how much
weight to give the decision or findings of a district judge or an administrative agency—the main
ones are substantial evidence, abuse of discretion, clearly erroneous, arbitrary and capricious,
reasonableness, and de novo. But all but the last are as a practical matter synonyms.”).
133. Most notably, agencies must publish notice of proposed rulemakings in the Federal Register
and allow interested parties an opportunity to comment. 5 U.S.C. § 553. Where an agency does
not follow the notice-and-comment requirement, the resulting agency action will be “without
observance of procedure required by law,” id. § 706(2)(D), and thus subject to reversal—unless the
action turns out to be an adjudication, for which the notice-and-comment requirement does not
apply, see, for example, Neustar, Inc. v. FCC, 857 F.3d 886, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (rejecting
challenge to FCC decision that was not the product of notice-and-comment rulemaking, where court
determined agency action constituted adjudication), or subject to one of the enumerated exceptions
in 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), see infra note 134 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Nat’l Educ. Ass’n
v. DeVos, 379 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1006–07 (N.D. Cal. 2019), appeal dismissed, No. 19-16260, 2019
WL 4656199 (9th Cir. Aug. 13, 2019) (vacating the Department of Education’s rule suspending the
implementation of the Obama Administration’s rule requiring additional disclosures for online
universities because the Department failed to comply with the “negotiated rulemaking”
requirements of the Higher Education Act, which require the formation of a representative
committee to negotiate proposed rules).
134. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (providing that the notice provisions do not apply to these categories).
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property, grants, and contracts; and military and foreign affairs135—from its
rulemaking procedures. Aimed at areas for which the benefits of notice and
comment may (arguably) be outweighed by the costs (e.g., interpretive rules
and policy statements)136 and areas where special considerations may make
prior notice inappropriate (e.g., military and “good-cause”),137 these
exceptions allow federal agencies to make important policy decisions without
following rulemaking procedures.138
Though these statutory exceptions form a critical component of federal
administrative practice, they are notably absent from Maryland law.139
Further, in contrast with the Federal APA, the Maryland APA definition of
“regulation” expressly includes guidelines, policy statements, interpretation
statements, and statements governing agency organization and practices,140
and the internal management exclusion is narrow in scope.141
A detailed examination of the Federal APA rulemaking exceptions,
which are already the subject of extensive academic commentary,142 is
beyond the scope of this Article. Among all of these important exceptions,
however, the exception for interpretive rules may carry the greatest potential
for misuse by agencies seeking to carry out their political agenda while
circumventing the burdensome notice-and-comment procedures. At least in
part, the potential for misuse is the result of the lack of any statutory
definition of “interpretive rule” and the Supreme Court’s refusal to “wade
into” the debate over the proper scope of the exception.143
135. Id. § 553(a) (excluding these areas from the APA’s rulemaking requirements).
136. Id. § 553(b)(B). As Judge Richard Posner once surmised: “Every governmental agency that
enforces a less than crystalline statute must interpret the statute, and it does the public a favor if it
announces the interpretation in advance of enforcement . . . .” Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82
F.3d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1996). Allowing agencies to forgo notice and comment theoretically
encourages them to regularly issue and update such guidance. See also, e.g., Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 550 (2000)
(“The advantages of the rulemaking process come at a high price, however. The courts have adopted
expansive interpretations of the elements of the rulemaking process that have had the effect of
making it long and costly.”).
137. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1), (b)(B).
138. See, e.g., Tomlinson, supra note 80, at 230.
139. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-101(g)(2)(i) (West 2022); see Tomlinson, supra note
80, at 230–31. Maryland law does exempt statements that “concern[] only internal management”
as well as responses to petitions for adoption of a regulation and declaratory rulings from the
definition of “regulation,” and thus the rulemaking process. STATE GOV’T § 10-101(g)(2)(i)–(iii).
140. STATE GOV’T § 10-101(g)(1)(iii)–(iv).
141. See Tomlinson, supra note 80, at 229.
142. See, e.g., id. at 230.
143. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 96 (2015) (collecting authorities); see, e.g.,
Guilford Coll. V. Wolf, No. 1:18CV891, 2020 WL 586672, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 2020) (“[T]he
distinction between legislative and interpretive rules is ‘enshrouded in considerable smog.’”
(quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984))).
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Interpretive rules are supposed to allow agencies “to advise the public
of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it administers.”144
Unlike a rule issued after notice and comment, interpretive rules lack “the
force and effect of law.”145 But there lies the rub, because interpretive rules
may have a binding effect anyway under the elaborate body of deference
principles courts have developed.146
Because interpretive rules are not subject to the notice-and-comment
requirement, they are a popular method for agencies to clarify policies.
However, agencies that attempt to skirt the notice-and-comment
requirements by couching new rules as “interpretive rules” do so at risk of
having to start the rulemaking process from square one if a court determines
that the rule goes beyond merely clarifying existing statutes and
regulations.147 Courts have offered myriad formulations of the standard for
where a rule exceeds the bounds of the interpretive exemption, such as where
it “supplements a statute, adopts a new position inconsistent with existing
regulations, or otherwise effects a substantive change.”148 Whether to take
on the substantial cost of notice and comment or instead proceed via
interpretive rule turns on “eminently practical” considerations.149 As one
scholar described this balancing act: “The agency knows that its
interpretative rules are much more vulnerable to judicial rejection in an
enforcement proceeding, and that it is more likely to err when it issues a rule
without going through the notice and comment procedure.”150 It is far easier,
however, for an agency to change course when it is displeased with the effect
of an interpretive rule—a detriment for an agency that may be looking to

144. Perez, 575 U.S. at 97 (quoting Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995)).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 109–110 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that while an “agency may not use
interpretive rules to bind the public . . . because it remains the responsibility of the court to decide
whether the law means what the agency says it means,” courts have “revolutionized the import of
interpretive rules’ exemption from notice-and-comment rulemaking” by developing “an elaborate
law of deference to agencies’ interpretations”); see, e.g., Walker, supra note 9, at 746 (“Whether
agency guidance is actually nonbinding on regulated parties—formally or at least functionally—is
subject to debate.”).
147. See, e.g., Guilford Coll., 2020 WL 586672, at *1, *5 (enjoining the Trump Administration
from applying its “interpretive rule” that would have caused holders of certain immigration visas
(such as student visas) to be deemed unlawfully present “not at the time an individual is formally
found to be out of status,” as was the case prior to the new interpretation, “but from the time an
adjudicator determines the status violation first occurred.” Notice-and-comment rulemaking was
required because the rule sought to “achieve a substantive policy outcome” and “implement” the
Immigration and Naturalization Act “rather than merely interpret it.” (citations omitted)).
148. Id. at *5 (quoting Children’s Hosp. of the King’s Daughters, Inc. v. Azar, 896 F.3d 615,
620 (4th Cir. 2018)).
149. Pierce, supra note 136, at 553–54.
150. Id.
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carry lasting influence after an administration change, and a benefit for an
agency looking to keep its options open and test the benefits of a particular
policy.
Cases at the margins may pose difficult questions under federal law, but
the issue is more clear-cut in Maryland, where policy statements are, by
definition, regulations. The narrow rulemaking exemption for “internal
management” is unlikely to apply to many interpretive rules, because
interpretive rules nearly always “affect how agency staff treat members of
the public.”151
c. Arbitrary and Capricious Review
Without doubt, one of the most productive and frequently invoked APA
standards is the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. Although courts do not
review agencies’ policy determinations, arbitrary-and-capricious review
allows litigants to come close to challenging policy decisions in court by
challenging the reasoning agencies employ to reach their policy decisions.
Courts have provided numerous examples of conduct fitting that standard.
Normally, an action would be arbitrary or capricious if:
[T]he agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended
it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter
to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.152
In addition, to survive arbitrary-or-capricious review, an agency must
examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
action.153 It is also arbitrary and capricious for an agency to depart from its
prior policy without acknowledging and explaining the departure: “An
agency may not, for example, depart from a prior policy sub silentio or simply
disregard rules that are still on the books.”154
Because arbitrary-and-capricious review targets an agency’s decisionmaking process, it is a particularly powerful tool for challenging a
regulation’s substance without asking a court to disagree with an agency’s
policy determinations. An agency’s failure to consider a particular argument

151. Tomlinson, supra note 80, at 231 (emphasis added).
152. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983).
153. See, e.g., id.; FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009).
154. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 515 (noting that “the requirement that an agency
provide reasoned explanation for its action would ordinarily demand that it display awareness that
it is changing position”).
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presented in public comments, or negative consequences of a policy
enactment, can provide the basis for arbitrary-and-capricious review. A new
administration’s efforts to repeal policies put in place by its predecessor can,
likewise, supply the basis for arbitrary-and-capricious review if the agency
does not do a good enough job laying the factual groundwork155 or relies upon
a flawed analysis to justify a policy change.156
Appropriately, judicial review of an agency’s decision-making process
is usually limited to the administrative record relied upon by the agency.157
Nonetheless, where a petitioner can muster strong evidence of “bad faith or
improper behavior,”158 courts may order extra-record discovery into the
actual reasons that may have motivated an agency’s decision, which may, in
turn, be used to support arguments that the decision was arbitrary and
capricious.159 Maryland likewise recognizes the administrative record rule,
subject to what it describes as a “narrow exception” for “evidence of alleged
procedural irregularities at the agency level,”160 though Maryland courts have
produced “little decisional guidance” on the scope of this exception.161
One apparent distinction between Maryland and federal administrative
review is their respective treatments of the arbitrary and capricious standard.

155. See, e.g., Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019) (vacating the Trump
Administration’s decision to reinstate a citizenship question in the census where the stated basis—
to assist with Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Voting Rights Act enforcement—was “contrived” and,
in fact, the evidence showed that “Commerce went to great lengths to elicit the request [for
citizenship information] from DOJ”).
156. See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1912
(2020) (vacating the Trump Administration’s recission of the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (“DACA”) program for failing to explain its new legal conclusion—contra that of previous
administrations—that DACA is illegal).
157. See, e.g., Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2573 (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978)).
158. Id. at 2574.
159. Id. (approving of extra-record discovery into inclusion of the citizenship question in the
census where the administrative record undermined the stated explanation). But cf. Trump v.
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018) (agreeing that the Court could consider extrinsic evidence in
evaluating an Establishment Clause challenge to the Trump Administration’s decision to bar entry
from predominantly Muslim countries, but declining to give that evidence meaningful weight in
light of the rational basis standard and deference owed to the President in immigration matters).
160. Erb v. Md. Dep’t of Env’t, 110 Md. App. 246, 267, 676 A.2d 1017, 1028 (1996). Maryland
law also recognizes that evidence of inconsistent decisions of a particular agency may be admissible
and “highly reliable and probative” in the arbitrary and capricious analysis. Id. (internal quotation
omitted).
161. Geier v. Md. Bd. of Physicians, No. 0709, 2015 WL 5921325, at *12 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
July 31, 2015). One published decision has offered that “[d]iscovery in circuit court should not be
permitted when a remand to the administrative agency is a viable alternative.” Venter v. Bd. of
Educ., 185 Md. App. 648, 684, 972 A.2d 328, 349 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Montgomery County v. Stevens, 337 Md. 471, 481–82, 654 A.2d 877 (1995)).
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As shown above,162 Maryland and federal courts articulate the standard very
differently: Federal courts emphasize the agency’s logic and decisionmaking, whereas Maryland courts emphasize the limits of the agency’s legal
authority and treat arbitrary-and-capricious review as highly deferential.
As a practical matter, the federal articulation of arbitrary-and-capricious
review seems to offer challengers more flexibility because it is not limited to
whether the agency exceeded its legal authority. A petitioner is free to argue
that a disputed regulation is illogical or that it overlooks something the
petitioner thinks is important. A court may or may not agree with these
arguments, but they are not foreclosed by the standard of review.
Yet despite these apparent differences, the Maryland Court of Appeals
“has characterized the arbitrary or capricious standard as similar to the
standard under federal administrative law,”163 and has held that “[f]or
guidance, a reviewing [Maryland] court may look to case law applying the
similar standard in federal administrative law.”164 Thus, there appears to be
a tension in Maryland’s concept of arbitrary and capricious review: While
the standard on its face focuses on different elements and appears much
narrower than the federal standard, federal law—which Maryland cases
consider “similar”—remains a relevant guide.
d. Federal-Question Review
Where a statute does not expressly provide a right of review—that is,
“in the absence or inadequacy” of “the special statutory review proceeding
relevant to the subject matter in a court specified by statute,” judicial review
is still generally available “in a court of competent jurisdiction.”165 Such nonstatutory review is almost always brought in the district courts, pursuant to
their federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.166
C. Actions Committed to Agency Discretion: Unreviewable, and
“Unreviewable”
Under both Maryland and federal law, a certain category of decisions—
those involving areas committed to an agency’s discretion—are largely
unreviewable by courts. Federal and Maryland law differ, however, both in
terms of the source of this rule and how strictly it applies.
162. See supra notes 130–131 and accompanying text.
163. Md. Off. of People’s Couns. v. Md. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 Md. 380, 399, 192 A.3d 744,
755 (2018).
164. MDOE, 465 Md. 169, 202, 214 A.3d 61, 81 (2019).
165. 5 U.S.C. § 703; see also id. § 704 (“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.”).
166. Judicial Review of Agency Action, supra note 121.
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The Federal APA provides for judicial review of agency decisions
“except to the extent that statutes preclude judicial review; or agency action
is committed to agency discretion by law.”167 This exemption from APA
review is narrow, applying only “in those rare instances where statutes are
drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.”168
An alternate formulation of this standard is that an agency decision is
unreviewable when there are “no judicially manageable standards . . . for
judging how and when an agency should exercise its discretion.”169
The Supreme Court’s recent opinion mandating further explanation
from the Trump Administration to support its (eventually omitted)
citizenship question for the 2020 census demonstrates just how narrow this
exception has become.170 Despite the broad discretion conferred upon the
Secretary of Commerce,171 with limited restrictions on “the form and content
of the census,”172 the Court concluded that the questionnaire was not
committed to agency discretion. Rather, “by mandating a population count
that will be used to apportion representatives, . . . the Act imposes ‘a duty to
conduct a census that is accurate and that fairly accounts for the crucial
representational rights that depend on the census and the apportionment.’”173
The citizenship question was “amenable to review for compliance with those
and other provisions of the Census Act, according to the general
requirements of reasoned agency decisionmaking”174—a standard that, if
taken at face value, could swallow the exception in nearly every situation.

167. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (internal paragraph numbers omitted).
168. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 212 (1945)), abrogated by Califano v.
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 826 (1985) (noting that
exception “should be invoked only where the substantive statute [leaves] the courts with no law to
apply” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1184 (1983)).
169. Speed Mining, Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 528 F.3d 310, 317 (4th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830) (alteration in original). In this respect, the “committed
to agency discretion” exception can be seen as a version of the Article III prohibition on courts
deciding political questions committed to coordinate branches of government. See Nixon v. United
States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) (noting that political questions are nonjusticiable where, inter alia,
there are no “judicially . . . manageable standards” for deciding them).
170. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2568 (2019).
171. See id. (noting that the Census Act “leave[s] much to the Secretary [of Commerce’s]
discretion,” such as a provision instructing the Secretary to take a census “in ‘such form and content
as he may determine, including the use of sampling procedures and special surveys’”) (quoting 13
U.S.C. § 141(a)).
172. Id. (noting restrictions on statistical sampling and on the ability to collect information via
direct inquiries when administrative records are available).
173. Id. at 2568–69 (quoting Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 819–20 (1992)) (citations
omitted).
174. Id. at 2569 (emphasis added).
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Furthermore, except where Congress has expressly precluded review,
the agencies’ own rules and informal policy statements can establish the
standards required for judicial review.175 Just as federal agencies can avail
themselves of this essentially unbridled discretion where it is available, so
too can they constrain themselves. Though setting forth such standards in
substantive regulations may limit an agency’s informal decision-making, it
may also have the salutary benefit of negating an agency’s ability to evade
judicial review in the future. In a dispute over the Department of Health and
Human Services’ (“DHS”) authority to strip an organization of a grant for a
teenage pregnancy prevention program, then-District Judge Ketanji Brown
Jackson first set forth the general rule that “a federal agency’s allocation of
congressionally-appropriated grant funding is the type of discretionary action
that is presumptively unreviewable.”176 But DHS could not rely on that rule
to avoid judicial review of its decision (apparently animated by its opposition
to sex education) to pull the plug on the grant. Rather, the court could review
the agency’s decision for compliance with the agency’s regulations
governing the grant program.177 So while there are important swaths of
federal agency actions that, by default, will not be subject to judicial review
under the APA, agencies have some incentive to cabin their discretion and
make it more onerous for future administrations to reverse their policies.
Notwithstanding the possibility that self-regulation can provide a focus
for judicial review, the fact that Congress can remove certain agency
decision-making from federal courts’ jurisdiction is a significant distinction
between federal and Maryland administrative review. Although Maryland
law does contain a principle, similar to that found in federal law, that an
agency’s decision in an area committed to agency discretion is ordinarily

175. Myriad efforts by the Trump Administration to avoid or limit judicial review were stymied
by regulations promulgated during previous administrations. See, e.g., Physicians for Soc. Resp. v.
Wheeler, 956 F.3d 634, 640 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (holding that the EPA directive prohibiting grant
recipients from serving on EPA advisory committees was reviewable where governing regulations
provided that the agency head “must . . . [a]ssure that the interests and affiliations of advisory
committee members are reviewed for conformance with applicable conflict of interest statutes [and
regulations]”) (alterations in original); Pol’y & Rsch., LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,
313 F. Supp. 3d 62, 76 (D.D.C. 2018), appeal dismissed, No. 18-5190, 2018 WL 6167378 (D.C.
Cir. Oct. 29, 2018) (concluding that HHS’s decision to terminate Teen Pregnancy Prevention
Program grants was reviewable because HHS regulations limited the agency’s discretion to
terminate monetary awards).
176. Pol’y & Rsch., LLC, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 68; Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
at 15–16, Pol’y & Rsch., LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 313 F. Supp. 3d 62 (D.D.C.
2018) (No. 1:18-cv-00346).
177. Pol’y & Rsch., LLC, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 68.
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unreviewable,178 a court may still overturn such an action if the agency acts
arbitrarily or capriciously, which, as discussed above, means “unreasonably
or without a rational basis.”179 Indeed, Maryland courts have held that—even
though “there generally must be a legislative grant of the right to seek judicial
review”—the Legislature cannot divest the courts of the inherent power they
possess to review and correct actions by an administrative agency which are
arbitrary, illegal, capricious or unreasonable.”180 The inherent power to
review administrative decisions absent statutory authorization is “extremely
limited,”181 and courts exercising their inherent authority must “take[] [care]
not to interfere with the legislative prerogative or with the exercise of sound
administrative discretion, where discretion is clearly conferred,”182 but it
prevents the legislature from removing a category of administrative decisions
entirely from the jurisdiction of Maryland courts. As the Court of Appeals’
decision in Linchester clarifies, at bottom, the rule that agencies’
discretionary actions are “unreviewable” can be seen as an alternate
articulation of the rule that, in reviewing agency decisions, courts do not
substitute their judgment for that of the agency.183 Maryland’s position
shows an even stronger reluctance to allow any agency decision to avoid
judicial scrutiny, though it is an open question whether such limited review
provides any meaningful constraints on agency discretion.
III. DEFERENCE
Administrative deference is the principle under which courts will defer
to agencies’ interpretations of the law under certain circumstances. Without
question, deference is one of the most debated topics in administrative law
because it implicates the limits of courts’ authority over agencies and thus
178. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Sanders, 250 Md. App. 85, 96, 245 A.3d 1108, 1114 (2021) (noting
that agency’s summary decision not to interfere with previous decision—as distinct from decision
in which agency considers new evidence—is discretionary and not subject to review).
179. MDOE, 465 Md. 169, 202, 214 A.3d 61, 81 (2019) (quoting Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md.
243, 297, 884 A.2d 1171, 1204 (2005). This rule stems from Maryland’s constitutional separation
of powers requirement, however, and not from a legislative restriction on courts’ authority, Dep’t
of Nat. Res. v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 225, 334 A.2d 514, 524 (1975), and
the Maryland Constitution simultaneously provides courts “constitutionally-inherent power to
review, within limits” agency decisions. Id. at 223, 334 A.2d at 523.
180. Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 273, 275, 884 A.2d 1171, 1189, 1190 (2005) (quoting
Crim. Injs. Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 500–01, 331 A.2d 55, 65 (1975)).
181. Id. at 277, 884 A.2d at 1191.
182. Id. at 275, 884 A.2d at 1190 (quoting Hurl v. Bd. of Educ., 107 Md. App. 286, 304–05, 667
A.2d 970, 979 (1995)).
183. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. at 226, 334 A.2d at 524 (citing State Ins. Comm’r
v. Nat’l Bureau of Cas. Underwriters, 248 Md. 292, 310, 236 A.2d 282, 292 (1967) in support of
the conclusion that discretionary actions are unreviewable, and for the proposition that the reviewing
court may not “make independent findings of fact or substitute its judgment for that of the agency”).
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dramatically affects the reach of agencies’ power. It is tempting to think of
deference as a kind of standard of review, and it is true that the deference a
court applies in a given situation can often determine the outcome of a case,
just like the degree of appellate scrutiny applicable to a particular legal
challenge can. But it is more precise to think of deference as a rule of
construction, which determines how courts ascertain the meaning of
ambiguous laws.
Deference principles are rooted in the notion—perhaps a legal fiction—
that when legislatures delegate lawmaking power to agencies, they intend the
agencies, in their expertise, to resolve ambiguities and fill in gaps in the
legislative scheme.184 Federal courts have developed a detailed taxonomy of
deference principles that apply to various kinds of ambiguous laws, and the
level of deference—if any—depends on first identifying what kind of law is
being interpreted.
A. Federal Deference
Judicial deference to federal agencies turns primarily on two questions:
(1) What is the agency interpreting (its organic statute, its regulations, or
something else)? and (2) What is the form of the agency’s interpretation (a
rule or adjudication, or something less formal)? These two factors have
spawned countless opinions, books, and permutations, but have coalesced
into the three deference doctrines discussed below.185

184. A recurring criticism of deference is that it is inconsistent with the Federal APA’s mandate
that “the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”
5 U.S.C. § 706; see, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2432–34 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring). But as the Supreme Court recently held, even when deferring to an agencies’
interpretations, courts do not abdicate their § 706 obligation, because they “determine the meaning”
of the law by deferring to an agency’s reasonable interpretation. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2418–20
(majority opinion).
185. The Chevron and Auer doctrines have been the subject of extensive academic and judicial
criticism, such that one potential strategy on appeal is to argue for their abrogation. See Christopher
J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 103, 104 (2018) (“In recent years, we have seen a growing call from the federal bench, on
the Hill, and within the legal academy to rethink administrative law’s deference doctrines to federal
agency interpretations of law.”). Skidmore deference remains malleable and ill-defined, see, for
example, Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1310 (2007) (“[W]ithin the realm of cases applying the sliding-scale
conception of Skidmore, consistency and coherence is lacking. Courts blur distinctions between
factors and often appear uncertain of the rationale underlying the various factors.”), and it, too, has
received judicial criticism. See, e.g., J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Tailoring Deference to Variety with
a Wink and a Nod to Chevron: The Roberts Court and the Amorphous Doctrine of Judicial Review
of Agency Interpretations of Law, 36 J. LEGIS. 18, 61 n.384 (2010) (quoting Justice Scalia’s criticism
of Skidmore as “a farce” and “moosh”).
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1. Chevron Deference—the Statute the Agency Administers
Surely the most familiar deference rule, Chevron deference—spelled
out in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.186—
applies to an agency’s interpretation of the statute it administers.187 Thus, for
example, Chevron deference applies to the FCC’s interpretations of the
Communications Act or the EPA’s interpretations of the Clean Air Act.
Under Chevron, courts employ a two-step test to determine whether to defer
to the agency’s interpretation of its organic statute. First, Chevron deference
is only available when the statutory provision being interpreted is
ambiguous—in other words, where “Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue . . . that is the end of the matter.”188 Where Congress
has not clearly spoken to the question, courts will defer to an agency’s
interpretation where it is “based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”189 The Court subsequently clarified, in United States v. Mead
Corp.,190 that Chevron deference only applies “when it appears that Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force
of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”191 Because these elements are
a prerequisite to a court according Chevron deference, some courts and
scholars have taken to referring to them as “Chevron step zero.”192
A surprising feature of Chevron deference is that it applies even when
an agency’s interpretation conflicts with an earlier judicial interpretation of
the statute at issue. In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand
X Internet Services,193 the Court held that “[a] court’s prior judicial
construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to
Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction
follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room
for agency discretion.”194 Though subject to significant criticism from sitting

186. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
187. Id. at 842–43. Conversely, Chevron deference does not apply to agency interpretations of
statutes that apply to multiple agencies and are not specially administered by any agency. Special
Feature, A Blackletter Statement of Federal Administrative Law, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 39 (2002).
188. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
189. Id. at 843. Chevron cautions, however, that “[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues
of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear
congressional intent.” Id. at 843 n.9.
190. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
191. Id. at 226–27.
192. See, e.g., Doe v. Tenenbaum, 127 F. Supp. 3d 426, 446 n.6 (D. Md. 2012).
193. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
194. Id. at 982. This is really just an application of Chevron step one, which provides that
deference is not afforded where Congress has clearly spoken to an issue.
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Supreme Court justices (including Justice Thomas, its author),195 the Brand
X doctrine serves to ensure that an accident of timing (e.g., an early decision
by a court) does not usurp the policymaking functions of an agency.
Conversely, Brand X can entice agencies to refuse to interpret an ambiguous
statutory term, leaving regulatory uncertainty and requiring practitioners to
relitigate the interpretation on a case-by-case basis in the U.S. courts of
appeals.196
2. Auer Deference—the Agency’s Own Regulations
Courts also defer to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations.
For instance, the FCC receives deference when interpreting Title 47 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, and the FTC receives deference when
interpreting Title 16. This form of deference, known as Auer197 deference or,
sometimes, Seminole Rock198 deference, may be less well-known than
Chevron deference, but it has been the subject of significant litigation,199
culminating in the Supreme Court’s 2019 decision, Kisor v. Willke,200 in
which the Court ultimately decided not to overturn Auer.201 The Court did,
however, provide a detailed exposition of its Auer jurisprudence.
Kisor clarified that Auer deference applies only to the interpretation of
regulations that are genuinely ambiguous,202 as determined using traditional

195. See Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690, 691 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (“Brand X appears to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), and traditional tools of statutory interpretation. . . . My skepticism of Brand
X begins at its foundation—Chevron deference.”).
196. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 338
(2002) (“Respondents are frustrated by the FCC’s refusal to categorize Internet services . . . .”);
Charter Advanced Servs. (MN), LLC v. Lange, 903 F.3d 715, 719 n.3 (8th Cir. 2018) (“We note
that while the FCC would be able to announce a classification decision regarding VoIP, it has so far
declined to do so. . . . Here the agency has decline[d] to provide guidance for well over a decade,
so that we may, in our discretion, proceed according to [our] own light.” (alterations in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers
Ass’n, Inc. v. New Prime, Inc., 192 F.3d 778, 785 (8th Cir. 1999))).
197. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
198. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
199. See, e.g., G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 721 (4th Cir.
2016), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (applying Auer deference to Department of Education letter
interpreting Title IX regulations).
200. 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (plurality opinion).
201. For a general discussion of Kisor and its potential effect on future cases, see John Grimm
& Mark Davis, Kisor v. Wilkie and the Next Chapter in Administrative Deference, MD. APP. BLOG
(July 24, 2019), https://mdappblog.com/2019/07/24/kisor-v-wilkie-and-the-next-chapter-inadministrative-deference/#more-3730.
202. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415.
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tools of statutory construction.203 Like with Chevron deference, if the
regulation’s meaning is clear, courts must give effect to that meaning.204 If
the regulation is ambiguous, a court still must determine if the agency’s
interpretation is reasonable, the boundaries of which are again aided by the
use of traditional tools of construction.205 Finally, a court must conduct an
“independent inquiry into whether the character and context of the agency’s
interpretation entitle[] it to [deference].”206 Essentially, this step requires
courts to examine an assortment of qualitative factors to ensure that deference
is appropriate under the circumstances.
First, courts should only defer to an agency’s “authoritative or official
position,” and not to ad hoc statements that do not reflect the agency’s official
views.207 The agency’s position need not come from the actual top decisionmaker, but it must “emanate” from the agency head using established
procedures.208 Second, the interpretation must implicate the agency’s
substantive expertise, since a fundamental justification for deference
principles is the need to account for this expertise.209 Some interpretive
questions might fall more appropriately under the ambit of a court—such as
a construction that involves common-law principles—and for those
questions, a court should not defer to an agency’s interpretation.210 Finally,
an agency’s interpretation of its own rules does not receive deference unless
it reflects a “fair and considered judgment.”211 Under this principle, courts
do not generally defer to after-the-fact rationalizations or positions adopted

203. Id. A court cannot declare a regulation “ambiguous” simply because it is confusing or
subject to multiple potential interpretations at first blush. Id. at 2416.
204. Id. at 2415.
205. Id. The interpretation “must come within the zone of ambiguity the court has identified
after employing all its interpretive tools.” Id. at 2416.
206. Id.
207. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Examples of “informal” views are myriad and
varied, from former FCC Chairman Ajit Pai’s “Harlem Shake” video opposing net neutrality, Daily
Caller, PSA from Chairman of the FCC Ajit Pai, YOUTUBE (Dec. 13, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LFhT6H6pRWg, to agency blogs, Business Blog, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/blog, to educational documents prepared solely
for the convenience of the public, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., PRIMER ON DRUG
OFFENSES
(2021)¸
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2021_Primer_Drugs.pdf. None of
these somewhat extreme examples would warrant Auer deference. Other examples collected by
Justice Kagan in her plurality opinion in Kisor include a speech of a mid-level official, an informal
memorandum of a telephone conversation, and a regulatory guide disclaiming authoritativeness.
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416–17.
208. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416.
209. Id. at 2417.
210. Id.
211. Id. (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012)).
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in litigation.212 Courts should also protect parties’ reliance interests, and thus
not defer to interpretations that create “unfair surprise to regulated parties.”213
3. Skidmore Deference—Everything Else
A final type of “deference” applies when no other form of deference is
available. Under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,214 courts will defer to an agency’s
legal conclusions to the extent it has “power to persuade, [even] if lacking
power to control.”215 It is fair to question whether Skidmore deference is
really deference at all, since a court is always free to adopt a conclusion it
finds persuasive.216 But, however it is characterized, Skidmore deference
reflects courts’ respect for agencies’ specialized expertise and willingness to
allow agencies to help resolve legal issues. Even where no strict rule of
deference applies, a party challenging an agency decision must still convince
a court that the agency’s reasoning is not persuasive.217
B. Maryland Deference
Deference principles also exist under Maryland administrative law, and
they are generally analogous to their federal counterparts, but less strictly
defined.218 As Court of Special Appeals Judge Friedman put it, “[i]n the
Maryland state system, we don’t have such a rigid taxonomy of deference,
but we generally apply the same kinds of deference to the same kinds of
administrative agency legal decisions.”219
Under Maryland law, “an administrative agency’s interpretation and
application of the statute which the agency administers should ordinarily be
212. Id. However, the Court did not shut the door on deferring to agencies’ litigation positions
altogether, noting that it had “not entirely foreclosed th[e] practice” of “giv[ing] deference to agency
interpretations advanced for the first time in [their] legal briefs.” Id. at 2417–18 n.6; see, e.g., Bible
v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 799 F.3d 633, 650 (7th Cir. 2015) (deferring to Secretary of
Education’s interpretation of the Higher Education Act set forth in an amicus brief).
213. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2418 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Long Island Care at
Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 159 (2007)).
214. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
215. Id. at 140.
216. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 185, at 1251–55 (collecting authorities advancing this
view); Hviding, supra note 12, at 15 (noting that “[s]ome scholars have said that Skidmore review
is just as ad hoc as de novo review,” and collecting citations).
217. Skidmore itself serves as an example where, though not legally binding, the Court was
persuaded by an agency’s amicus brief taking the position that firefighters who lived on premises
at a packing plant were owed wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act whenever they were oncall and expected to be available for company service. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139–40.
218. For a comprehensive analysis of deference principles in Maryland, see generally Hviding,
supra note 12.
219. Comptroller of Md. v. FC-Gen Operations Invs., LLC, No. 0946, 2022 WL 325940, at *7
n.1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 3, 2022) (Friedman, J., concurring).
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given considerable weight.”220 Yet, while a court must “give careful
consideration to the agency’s interpretation” of “a law that the agency has
been charged to administer,”221 it is “never binding upon the courts.”222 On
the contrary, courts “assess how much weight to accord that
interpretation,”223 and it is “always within [the court’s] prerogative to
determine whether an agency’s conclusions of law are correct, and to remedy
them if wrong.”224 Chevron-style deference in Maryland is variable, and
“[t]he weight to be accorded an agency’s interpretation of a statute depends
upon a number of considerations,”225 including whether the interpretation has
been applied consistently for a long period of time, the extent to which the
agency engaged in a “process of reasoned elaboration” in reaching its
interpretation, and whether the interpretation is the product of neither
contested adversarial proceedings nor formal rulemaking (in which case it is
entitled to little weight).226
Maryland law also embodies a version of Auer deference: “Reviewing
courts should give special deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own
regulations because the agency is best able to discern its intent in
promulgating those regulations.”227 One notable distinction, however, is that
agencies receive greater deference under Maryland law when interpreting
their own regulations than when interpreting the statute they administer,228
220. Md. Aviation Admin. v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 572, 873 A.2d 1145, 1154 (2005) (collecting
cases).
221. MDOE, 465 Md. 169, 203, 214 A.3d 61, 81 (2019).
222. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 305 Md. 145, 161, 501 A.2d 1307, 1315
(1986).
223. MDOE, 465 Md. at 203, 873 A.3d at 82.
224. Schwartz v. Md. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 385 Md. 534, 554, 870 A.2d 168, 180 (2005). Chevron
does note that “[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must
reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.” Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984). But this is just an
articulation of the first step of the Chevron analysis: determining whether a statute is ambiguous.
The Maryland-law principle that agency interpretations are never binding on the courts, therefore,
is fundamentally distinct from federal law, which allows agencies to “authoritatively resolve
ambiguities in statutes and regulations.” Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211
(2015) (Scalia, J., concurring).
225. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 305 Md. at 161, 501 A.2d at 1315.
226. Id. at 161–62, 501 A.2d at 1315; see also MDOE, 465 Md. at 203–04, 214 A.3d at 82.
227. Kim v. Md. State Bd. of Physicians, 196 Md. App. 362, 372, 9 A.3d 534, 540 (2010).
Additionally, at least one Maryland case has directly cited Auer for the proposition that “[i]t is wellsettled that an administrative agency is entitled to deference in the interpretation of its own
propounded regulations unless the agency’s interpretation is clearly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation.” Para v. 1691 Ltd. P’ship, 211 Md. App. 335, 389, 65 A.3d 221, 253 (2013) (citing
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).
228. Md. Comm’n on Hum. Rels. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 295 Md. 586, 593, 457 A.2d 1146,
1150 (1983) (“Because an agency is best able to discern its intent in promulgating a regulation, the
agency’s expertise is more pertinent to the interpretation of an agency’s rule than to the
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whereas in Kisor, the Court clarified that agencies do not receive any greater
deference under Auer than under Chevron.229
One interesting question is whether Maryland and federal law’s
different concepts of deference yields different outcomes. Here, it is possible
to draw some empirical conclusions. One scholar recently calculated that
Maryland agencies’ statutory interpretations were upheld in 63% of quasijudicial cases and 62% of quasi-legislative cases, but when agencies
interpreted their own regulations, they won in 100% of cases.230 A study of
federal agency review found that agencies won 77.4% of the time under
Chevron, 56% of the time under Skidmore, and 38.5% under a de novo
review.231 And another study found that since 2011, federal courts of appeals
applied Auer deference in an average of 75% of cases.232 These studies
involved different methodologies and corpora of cases, so a healthy measure
of caution is appropriate, but these numbers generally comport with the ways
Maryland and federal courts describe their principles of deference: Chevron
deference is stronger than the deference Maryland courts afford agency
statutory interpretations, whereas federal courts are significantly less
deferential than Maryland courts concerning agencies’ interpretations of their
own regulations.
IV. THE ROLE PATH TO THE APPELLATE COURTS
Although administrative appeals follow various courses depending on
the kind of action being reviewed and whether review is sought in federal or
state court, all roads usually lead, eventually, to an appellate court. In the
federal system, where statutes variously vest jurisdiction in district courts and
courts of appeals, an appellate court is often the first and—unless the
Supreme Court agrees to hear a case—last stop.
interpretation of its governing statute.”). In NRG Energy, Inc. v. Maryland Public Service
Commission, 252 Md. App. 680, 684 n.1, 260 A.3d 770, 773 n.1 (2021), however, the Court of
Special Appeals considered an interesting question: whether an agency is “entitled to deference
when addressing an issue of first impression on which it has yet to develop precedent, consistent
rulings or expertise.” The court did not specifically answer this question, but the implications are
significant. If Maryland agencies are entitled to less deference on novel legal questions, it would
mark a significant departure from federal deference principles. See supra Section III.A.
229. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2416 (2019) (plurality opinion) (“Some courts have
thought . . . that . . . agency constructions of rules receive greater deference than agency
constructions of statutes. . . . But that is not so.” (citations omitted)).
230. Hviding, supra note 12, at 30.
231. Barnett & Walker, supra note 12, at 30.
232. Barmore, supra note 12, at 830. The circuit-by-circuit numbers varied considerably,
ranging from as low as 50% in the Seventh Circuit to 92% in the Fifth Circuit. Id. The D.C. Circuit,
famous for hearing a high volume of administrative cases, applied Auer deference 65% of the time,
in 31 cases—the second lowest rate for any circuit. Id.
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But in Maryland, where all review proceedings begin in the circuit court,
further review is often available in at least one appellate court. Technically,
review in the Court of Special Appeals is only available where allowed by
statute and, as a general rule, appeals are not permitted from “final
judgment[s] of a court entered or made in the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction in reviewing the decision of . . . an administrative agency.”233
Thus, by default, there is not a guaranteed right of further review beyond the
circuit court. However, under the Maryland APA, any party “aggrieved by a
final judgment of a circuit court . . . may appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals,”234 and courts have also held that administrative mandamus
decisions in the circuit court are appealable to the Court of Special
Appeals.235 The upshot is that for all APA and administrative mandamus
review proceedings, Maryland law allows for a tripartite system of judicial
review with two layers of review as a matter of right.236 For non-APA
appeals, review beyond the circuit court is only available where permitted by
statute.
An important feature of judicial appellate review in both Maryland and
federal administrative law is that appellate courts “look through” the trial
court’s decision237 and review the underlying agency decision itself.238 This
233. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-302(a) (West 2022). Although technically the
circuit court does not exercise appellate jurisdiction over administrative agencies, courts have held
that the restriction in section 12-302 still applies. See Gisriel v. Ocean City Bd. of Supervisors of
Elections, 345 Md. 477, 496, 693 A.2d 757, 766–67 (1997) (“[W]hen a circuit court proceeding in
substance constitutes ordinary judicial review of an adjudicatory decision by an administrative
agency . . . § 12-302(a) is applicable, and an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals is not
authorized . . . .”).
234. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-223(b)(1) (West 2022).
235. Matthews v. Hous. Auth. of Balt. City, 216 Md. App. 572, 582, 88 A.3d 852, 857 (2014).
236. See generally Glenn T. Harrell, Jr., Too Much Judicial Review of Administrative Agency
Decisions?,
ADMIN.
L.
NEWS,
Nov.
2013,
at
2,
https://cdn.laruta.io/app/uploads/sites/7/legacyFiles/uploadedFiles/MSBA/Member_Groups/Sectio
ns/Administrative_Law/AdminLawNov13.pdf.
237. The “look-through” rule can be a slight over-simplification of what is actually before the
appellate court: Although the appellate court ultimately reviews the underlying agency decision, it
may still have occasion to rule on aspects of the circuit court’s ruling as well. For example, in Board
of Education of Harford County v. Sanders, the Court of Special Appeals upheld as unreviewable
the agency’s decision to summarily deny a petition for rehearing, and in doing so, held that the
circuit court had erred in remanding the matter to the agency for further consideration. 250 Md.
App. 85, 93, 248 A.3d 1108, 1112 (2021). Indeed, by the time a petition for judicial review reaches
the Court of Special Appeals, any number of decisions by the circuit court—such as remand orders,
or rulings on dispositive motions—may also be subject to review. See id.
238. Safari Club Int’l v. Zinke, 878 F.3d 316, 325 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e review the
administrative action directly, according no particular deference to the judgment of the District
Court.” (quoting Holland v. Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 309 F.3d 808, 814 (D.C. Cir. 2002)); Kenwood
Gardens Condos., Inc. v. Whalen Props., LLC, 449 Md. 313, 324, 144 A.3d 647, 654 (2016) (“In
reviewing the final decision of an administrative agency . . . we look through the circuit court’s and
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has led some to question whether review by an intermediate appellate court
serves a real purpose, since it is performing the same function as the trial
court below it.239 Commentators have suggested eliminating one layer of
review—either at the circuit court240 or Court of Special Appeals241 stage.
Both proposals would be problematic. Eliminating circuit court review
would be unconstitutional because it would result in the Court of Special
Appeals impermissibly exercising original jurisdiction over agency
decisions.242 On the other hand, eliminating review in the Court of Special
Appeals—which, unlike the circuit courts, issues binding, statewide
opinions—would hurt the development of administrative-law jurisprudence
and place a greater burden on the Court of Appeals to resolve inter-circuit
conflicts.243
In Maryland, where judicial review is initiated by filing the appropriate
petition in the circuit court, there is no special procedure for appealing the
circuit court’s decision. An appeal is commenced the same way as for any
decision of the circuit court, by filing a notice of appeal under Maryland Rule
8-201.244 In federal court, however, where courts of appeals have original
jurisdiction to review an agency decision, review is obtained by filing a
“petition for review,” which differs from a notice of appeal.245 Unlike a
notice of appeal, which is filed with the district court,246 a petition for review
is filed directly in the court of appeals.247
intermediate appellate court’s decisions, although applying the same standards of review, and
evaluate[] the decision of the agency.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting People’s Couns.
for Balt. Cnty. v. Loyola Coll., 406 Md. 54, 66, 956 A.2d 166, 173 (2008)).
239. As Judge Harrell observed, because each reviewing court reviews the original agency
decision, multiple layers of judicial review provides “for up to three levels of judicial review . . . on
the same record and under the same standards of review.” Harrell, supra note 236, at 2. In order to
justify the expense to litigants and burden on the courts, Judge Harrell argues that subsequent stages
of review ought to “serve ideally some tangible and higher purpose independent from the first tier.”
Id. at 3. Under the current system, however, Judge Harrell maintains that successive tiers of review
allow only the utility of “an assumedly ‘fresh’ and un-jaded set of eyes.” Id.
240. Id. at 3 (citing Tomlinson, supra note 80, at 217–18).
241. Id. at 4.
242. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
243. Joel A. Smith, Sitting in Review of the Watchman: The Importance of Judicial Review of
Administrative
Decisions,
ADMIN.
L.
NEWS,
Nov.
2013,
at
6,
7–8,
https://cdn.laruta.io/app/uploads/sites/7/legacyFiles/uploadedFiles/MSBA/Member_Groups/Sectio
ns/Administrative_Law/AdminLawNov13.pdf. Eliminating intermediate appellate review of
administrative decisions would place Maryland in a minority of states: thirty-two states allow twotier appellate review as a matter of right, compared to only nine in which review in an appellate
court is discretionary. Id. at 6, 7–8.
244. MD. RULE 8-201 (providing procedure for filing notice of appeal).
245. FED. R. APP. P. 15.
246. FED. R. APP. P. 3(a)(1).
247. FED. R. APP. P. 15(a)(1).
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CONCLUSION
A comparison between Maryland and federal administrative review
procedures reveals interesting aspects of the nature of judicial review itself.
Although both function similarly, their differences reflect the competing
principles of judicial independence, legislative priority, and executive
decision-making.
Federal courts reviewing agency decisions are
circumscribed both by statutory limits and an extensive body of court-made
deference principles. Maryland courts have similar limitations, but retain
ultimate authority to review agency actions, with somewhat more flexibility
in their review.
In a sense, comparing Maryland and federal administrative appeals also
sheds light on the development of administrative law generally. While
federal administrative review has deep common-law roots, modern federal
administrative law is almost entirely codified by the APA and agency
regulations, aided by a body of highly developed case law. Maryland law, in
contrast, reflects a greater balance between statutory and common-law rules,
with some procedures being codified for the first time as recently as fifteen
years ago. In this respect, Maryland law can be a useful illustration of how
modern administrative law evolved from earlier principles.
Yet, while federal administrative law is stable, it is not static. Recent
cases—particularly challenges to Trump Administration actions—reveal a
renewed appetite to look closely at agency decisions, agency
characterizations of their actions, and, in extreme cases, look beyond their
stated rationale to assess for pretext.248 Courts must constantly resolve the
tension between skepticism of the administrative state and deference to the
decision making of the political branches; at times, one viewpoint prevails
more strongly over the other, all based on judicial doctrines that have little or
no anchoring in the Federal APA. The constant churn of agency
policymaking (amid changing administrations) and the philosophical debate
within courts will continue to provide grist for federal and Maryland courts
to develop and refine the law of administrative review.

248. See, e.g., supra notes 147, 155–159, 171–177 and accompanying text.

